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Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan
Satoru Kasahara*, Sergey Paltsev, John Reilly, Henry Jacoby and A. Denny Ellerman
Abstract
In 2003 Japan proposed a Climate Change Tax to reduce its CO2 emissions to the level required by the
Kyoto Protocol. If implemented, the tax would be levied on fossil fuel use and the revenue distributed to
several sectors of the economy to encourage the purchase of energy efficient equipment. Analysis using the
MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model shows that this policy is unlikely to bring
Japan into compliance with its Kyoto target unless the subsidy encourages improvement in energy intensity
well beyond Japan’s recent historical experience. Similar demand-management programs in the U.S., where
there has been extensive experience, have not been nearly as effective as they would need to be to achieve
energy efficiency goals of the proposal. The Climate Change Tax proposal also calls for restricting Japan’s
participation in the international emission trading. We consider the economic implications of limits on
emissions trading and find that they are substantial. Full utilization of international emission trading by
Japan reduces the carbon price, welfare loss, and impact on its energy-intensive exports substantially. The
welfare loss with full emissions trading is one-sixth that when Japan meets its target though domestic actions
only, but Japan can achieve substantial savings even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the
Russian allowance is not available in international markets.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Japan ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and adopted “The Guideline for Measures to Prevent
Global Warming,” which identified actions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions with the
goal of meeting the target specified in the Protocol (Government of Japan, 2002). The Guideline
required several ministries to submit further reports on progress toward meeting the target and
identifying additional actions as needed. A report of the Ministry of Environment of Japan
(MOE, 2004a) emphasized a policy mix but with a central focus on a carbon tax. Other policies
considered were domestic carbon emission trading, promoting energy research, development of a
mandatory greenhouse gas accounting and reporting system, and the adoption of the daylight
saving time in summer. The carbon tax, called the Climate Change Tax, was proposed by the
Ministry in August 2003 (MOE, 2003). The proposed tax rate was 3400 yen per ton of carbon
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2(yen/tC) emitted from the combustion of fossil fuels. The proposal would distribute the revenue
from the tax to end-use sectors of the economy as a subsidy for a purchase of energy-efficient
equipment. The MOE estimates that the Kyoto target for Japan could be met through this tax-and-
subsidy method. The MOE report favors this domestic policy over international emission trading,
which the report argues should be limited to 1.6% of the 1990 emissions. The Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI) has made their interim report publicly available as
well (METI, 2004). In contrast to the MOE, METI emphasized international emission trading as a
major tool for greenhouse gas emissions reduction. METI objections to a carbon tax are based on
their conclusion that it would be relatively ineffective in the residential and transportation sectors,
would damage international competitiveness, and would result in carbon leakage.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the Climate Change Tax proposed by the MOE using the
MIT Emission Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, a computable general equilibrium
economic model that has been widely used to study climate change policy, and then consider the
role international emissions trading scenarios as favored by METI could play in reducing
economic impacts. For this analysis, we have adjusted some parameters of the EPPA model to
make the results directly comparable to the MOE study. The MOE used the Asia-Pacific
Integrated Model (AIM), which includes AIM-EndUse, AIM-Material, and AIM-TopDown
components (AIM Project Team, 2003). AIM-EndUse is a bottom-up technology selection
model that contains a detailed dataset of existing technologies and energy-related facilities.
Results from this AIM component are central to the policy recommendations of the MOE.
The EPPA model structure differs from that of AIM-EndUse. The EPPA model can be
considered a top-down model, representing technology by means of relatively aggregated
production functions for each sector of the economy. However, on the energy side EPPA
integrates bottom-up engineering information for energy production technologies (Jacoby et al.,
2004) The motivation for this study is a comparison of the results from two models that use
different approaches to technology representation. We compare the projections with relevant
historical experience of Japan, and of demand-side management programs in the U.S. that are in
many ways similar to the proposed energy-efficiency subsidy scheme.
In the next section we describe the proposed climate change policy in Japan and summarize
the results of the MOE study. In Section 3 we review the historical relationships between energy
intensity and carbon intensity in Japan compared with other major industrial countries. In
Section 4 we present the EPPA model and the adjustments we made for a proper comparison
between the MOE analysis and our simulations. Section 5 describes the results of analysis of the
climate change tax proposed by the MOE. In Section 6 we investigate the role of international
emission trading and restrictions on its use in meeting Japan’s Kyoto target. Section 7
summarizes our findings.
2. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN JAPAN
Rising atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other gases emitted from burning of
fossil fuels and other human activity may cause significant global warming in the absence of
policy intervention. In response to this threat, Japan ratified the United Nations Framework
3Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, which call for industrialized countries to
limit their greenhouse gas (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFC, PFC, SF6) emissions. Japan’s emissions target
is to return to 6% below a base-year level during the first commitment period of the Protocol.
The first commitment period runs from 2008 to 2012. The base-year for CO2, CH4, and N2O is
1990. The Protocol permits some flexibility regarding the choice of a base-year for HFC, PFC,
and SF6 gases and Japan has chosen 1995 for them.
The role carbon sinks from land-use change could play in meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets
was not fully agreed until the Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in Marrakesh (UNFCCC,
2001). As a result of agreement there, specific limits on carbon sinks from forest management
for each Party were established. Japan’s sink limit was set at 13.0 million tons of carbon per year
(MtC/year), or 47.7 million tons of CO2 (MtCO2/year). From Table 1 one can see that the
addition of the 47.7 MtCO2/year to the target would reduce by more than one-half the reduction
needed to get from base-year emissions of 1236.9 MtCO2 to the original Kyoto target of 1162.7.
This calculation somewhat overestimates the actual importance of sinks because, in the absence
of climate policy, emissions in Japan are projected to grow above the base-year level. The full
magnitude of the reduction effort is thus greater than the 74.2 MtCO2 difference between the
base-year emissions and the Kyoto target, and the possible contribution of sinks proportionally
smaller. Nevertheless, the sink allocation is substantial given Japan’s emissions and likely
required reduction. It should be noted that while carbon dioxide emissions have grown since
1990, emissions of other greenhouse gases (GHGs) were lower in 2002 compared to their base-
year levels. MOE (2003) attributes this reduction to a decrease in domestic coal production, and
thus lower methane emissions from that source, and voluntary measures by chemical producing
firms that have limited emissions of other GHGs.
Table 1. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and The Kyoto Protocol Target for Japan (MtCO2e).
CO2 CH4 N2O HFC PFC SF6 Total
1990 1122.3 24.7 40.2
1991 1131.4 24.6 39.7
1992 1148.9 24.5 39.9
1993 1138.7 24.4 39.7
1994 1198.2 24 40.6
1995 1213.1 23.3 40.8 20.2 12.6 16.9 1326.9
1996 1234.8 22.9 41.7 19.9 15.2 17.5 1352
1997 1242 22.1 42.2 19.8 16.9 14.8 1357.8
1998 1195.2 21.5 40.8 19.3 16.5 13.4 1306.7
1999 1228.4 21.1 35.1 19.8 14.9 9.1 1328.4
2000 1239 20.7 37.8 18.6 13.9 6.8 1336.8
2001 1213.8 20.2 35.1 15.9 11.7 5.7 1302.4
2002 1247.6 19.5 35.4 13.3 9.6 5.3 1330.7
Base-year 1122.3 24.7 40.2 20.2 12.6 16.9 1236.9
Kyoto target with No Sinks Credits 1162.7
Marrakesh Accord Target with Full Utilization of Allowable Sinks 1210.4
Note:
MtCO2e
indicates
CO2-equivalent
emissions with
non-CO2 gases
converted at
FCCC approved
global warming
potentials
(GWPs).
Source: The Ministry of Environment of Japan (2002), UNFCCC (2001).
4Measures adopted under the 2002 Guideline encouraged Japanese companies and business
associations to carry out voluntary efforts, but did not outline mandatory caps or actions by
companies (Government of Japan, 2002). The Guideline did, however, identify a set of reduction
goals for different categories of emissions (Table 2). The goal for CO2 emissions from energy
use was 2% below 1990 levels. Methane, nitrous oxide, and CO2 emissions from non-energy use
were to be reduced by 0.5% from base-year levels, while emissions of HFC, PFC, and SF6 could
increase by 2% above base-year levels. Use of the Kyoto mechanisms allowing for international
flexibility, including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)
projects, was seen as meeting the balance of reductions needed to get to 6% below base-year
levels. The Guideline document does not mention international emission trading specifically,
however, it is generally considered to be one of the “Kyoto flexibility mechanisms.” The extent
to which international emission trading could be used by Japan to meet its target would depend
partly on how the Kyoto Protocol is implemented by other Parties. Table 2 also presents an
assessment of the government’s estimates of emissions in a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario
made by MOE (2004a). It shows that energy-related CO2 emissions are expected to increase in
2010 by 7.1% from the base-year level. Carbon dioxide from the non-energy use, methane, and
nitrous oxide emissions are expected to meet the target established by the government. The
estimate for forest management is insufficient to create credits up to the Marrakesh-agreed limit
for sinks. Thus, Japan is expected to miss its Kyoto target without further effort to reduce
emissions. The projected failure to meet the target with the voluntary measures identified in the
Guideline document led to the MOE’s proposed carbon tax, and METI’s counter proposal to rely
more on international emissions trading.
In addition to the interim reports from the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and the Ministry
of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) already mentioned, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MLIT), the
Ministry of Internal Affair and Communications (MIC), and the Cabinet Office are required to
report on progress toward meeting the Kyoto target. The MAFF (2004) also favored a carbon
tax, proposing that the tax revenue should be partially used for forest management activities. The
MLIT (2004) report does not refer to any mandatory methods. So far, MIC and the Cabinet have
not made public their reports.
Table 2. Required Reduction of Emissions relative to 1990 level and 2010 forecast.
Category
Government
Target 2010 BAU Forecast
CO2 emissions from energy use including reductions by
innovative technologies and change of lifestyle
– 2% +7.1%
CO2 emissions from non-energy use, methane, and nitrous
oxide emissions
– 0.5% – 0.9 ~ – 0.4%
Emissions of HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 + 2% Close examination underway
The use of Sinks – 3.9% – 3.1%
The use of the Kyoto Mechanism – 1.6%
Total – 6.0%
Source: Government of Japan (2002), MOE (2004a).
5In contrast to the government reports, Nippon Keidanren the largest trade association in Japan
with 1623 members from energy-intensive sectors and automotive associations, insists that
voluntary efforts are sufficient. The association points to the fact that its members’ emissions are
below 1990 level despite the shut-down of some nuclear plants and the need to increase the use
of fossil electric capacity to make up for the lost nuclear generation. The organization strongly
opposes measures such as environmental taxes or domestic emission trading and stresses the fact
that Japan has already achieved a lower carbon intensity of GDP (gross domestic product) than
other countries. Their claim is based on international comparisons of electric generation
efficiency, energy consumption intensity in iron and steel, and CO2 intensity of chemical
production (Nippon Keidanren, 2004a, 2004b).
As previously noted, the MOE conclusion about the carbon tax required to meet the Kyoto
target was based on the analysis using the AIM model. As already noted, AIM-EndUse is a
bottom-up technology model. It can simulate the emissions impact of different technology
choices. AIM-Material is a multi-sectoral, economy-wide model of Japan. AIM-TopDown is a
global CGE model. These components were variously used in the MOE study. Four scenarios
were considered: Constant Technology that keeps current energy technologies and their
efficiency constant, Market Selection that adjusts the selection of energy technologies based on
changing prices and costs of technologies, Carbon Tax Only that considers a tax on fossil fuels at
the rate of 30,000 yen/tC (or approximately 300 $/tC), and Tax and Subsidy that combines a
carbon tax of 3,400 yen/tC (or approximately 34 $/tC) with the tax revenue distributed as a
subsidy for the purchase of more energy-efficient technologies. The study reports emissions for
the economy disaggregated to five sectors: Industry, Transport, Energy Transformation,
Services, and Households. Emissions from electricity production are allocated to these five
sectors based on their electricity use.
The study found the Tax and Subsidy scenario (Table 3) to result in the lowest level of
emissions in 2010. It was sufficient to meet the Kyoto emission target. The Tax and Subsidy
policy reduced CO2 emissions in 2010 to 14% below the Constant Technology scenario. Notably,
Table 3. Greenhouse gas emissions in AIM-EndUse Model (Mt-CO2e).
2010
Sector 1990 2000
Constant
Technology
Market
Selection
Carbon
Tax Only
Carbon Tax
& Subsidy
Industry 490 495 470 452 432 427
Household 138 166 193 172 147 136
Office 124 152 162 148 134 127
Transport 212 256 271 263 250 247
Energy transform 77 86 88 86 81 80
Energy-Related CO2 Total 1042 1155 1185 1121 1044 1017
Non-energy-related CO2, CH4, N2O 143 141 137 137 137 137
HFCs, PFCs, SF6 48 36 73 73 73 73
GHG Total 1233 1332 1395 1330 1254 1226
Forest sink – 35.6 – 35.6 – 35.6 – 48.0
Total 1233 1360 1295 1218 1178
Source: MOE (2003).
6the Tax and Subsidy scenario, with a tax of just 3,400 yen/tC was projected to result in a greater
emissions reduction than Carbon Tax Only scenario with a tax rate of 30,000 yen/tC, as shown in
Table 3 and Figure 1. The subsidy portion of this policy was thus estimated to be very effective
in reducing emissions. The Market Selection scenario results in GHG emissions in 2010 at the
level of 2002 emissions, about 7.5% above 1990 emissions. This closely coincides with the
recent MOE (2004a) projection for a business-as-usual scenario (Table 2).
The MOE estimates the Tax and Subsidy policy will result in total annual subsidy of 952 billion
yen, to be distributed as in Table 4. Most of the subsidy is directed to encourage investment into
higher-efficiency facilities. The subsidy to the forest sector is directed toward offsetting the labor
costs of forest management. AIM-Material was used to estimate the GDP change due to these
policies. Compared to the Constant Technology scenario the GDP loss was estimated to be 0.16%
in the Carbon Tax Only scenario and 0.061% in the Tax and Subsidy scenario.
The structure of the AIM-TopDown submodel did not allow a direct implementation of the
scenarios mentioned above. Emissions were constrained with a domestic cap to meet the Kyoto
target. The estimated carbon price was $350/tC with a GDP loss of 0.45% compared to the
business-as-usual scenario. With international emission trading the GDP loss was estimated to be
0.2%. The MOE (2003) did not report the carbon price in the international emission trading
scenario.1
Figure 1. Historical and Future GHG Emissions (Excluding Forest Sinks) as Forecasted by the
AIM-EndUse Model, with Kyoto and Marrakesh Targets. (Sources: MOE, 2002; MOE, 2003.)
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 A final MOE report of November 2004 revised the proposed carbon tax rate down to 2400 yen/TC from 3400 rate
in the draft (MOE, 2004a). The final report estimates a GDP impact of –0.01% and carbon dioxide emissions
reduction of 52 million tons of CO2 from reference levels. Based on the reference, and estimated baseline sink
uptake, this would leave Japan needing another 52 million tons of reductions according to the report. It stresses
the importance of additional voluntary measures and environmental education of public as means of achieving
further reductions. The exact distribution of subsidy is not provided, therefore, we have not modeled this change
in the MOE proposal yet.
7Table 4. Distribution of Subsidy in AIM-EndUse Model.
Sector Subsidized Measures and Devices
Additional investment
(billion Yen)
Industry Boiler conversion control, High performance motor,
High performance industrial furnace, etc.
101.3
Household High efficiency air conditioner, High efficiency gas stove,
Solar water heater, High efficiency gas cooking device, etc.
353.9
Office High efficiency electric refrigerator, High efficiency air
conditioner, High efficiency gas absorption heat pump, etc.
194.5
Transportation High efficiency gasoline private car, High efficiency diesel car,
Hybrid commercial car, High efficiency diesel bus, etc.
106.6
Forest Plantation, Weeding, Tree thinning, Multilayered thinning,
Improvement of natural forest, etc.
195.7
Total 952.0
Source: MOE (2003).
3. TRENDS IN JAPAN’S ENERGY AND CARBON INTENSITY
Figure 2 presents trends in carbon intensity for Japan, the USA, Canada, and selected
European countries from 1980 to 2000 calculated from data of the Institute of Energy Economics,
Japan (2004) which is in turn based on World Bank and IEA data. For these comparisons, GDP in
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms as computed by the World Bank was used. Carbon
intensities for all countries shown in this figure tend to decline over this period, however, Japan’s
intensity shows little if any improvement in the 1990s. As a result of this slower improvement,
France and Italy overtake Japan. Considerable caution is needed in making comparisons of the
absolute intensity levels in such aggregate comparisons. A lower aggregate carbon intensity for a
country does not necessarily translate to greater efficiency in individual processes, and thus, for
example, this evidence on aggregate intensity does not necessarily contradict the data on energy
efficiency of particular processes in material terms that are the basis of the Nippon Keidanren
(2004a, 2004b) claim.
One critical element in aggregate comparisons is the choice of a basis for making
international comparisons of output in common currency units. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is
widely recognized as an improvement over market exchange rates as a basis for converting
currency to a common base but it is at best an approximation of any ideal comparison. As an
example of the importance of purchasing power conversion, comparing countries as in Figure 2
using market exchange rates would show Japan to have a considerably lower energy and
emissions intensity than all other countries. With the PPP conversion Japan’s intensity is similar
to France and Italy.
There are also broad structural differences among countries. For example, relative to Japan,
France relies more heavily on nuclear electricity, while Italy imports electricity from other
countries and thus any emissions related to this electricity production does not show up in Italy’s
carbon account. The mix of fossil fuels, industrial structure, land area, climate, and availability
of non-fossil resources such as hydro capacity can also have a large effect on international
comparisons of both energy and carbon intensity.
8Figure 2. Carbon Intensity in Selected Developed Countries. (Source: Institute of Energy Economics,
Japan, 2004.)
Figure 3 focuses on Japan, showing real GDP (1995 prices) and CO2 emissions from 1990 to
2002. During this period CO2 emissions followed the pattern of economic activities, declining
during the economic recessions of 1993, 1998, and 2001. Figure 4 shows annual carbon and
energy intensity in Japan, and to examine the apparent slowdown in Japan’s improvement that
was observed in Figure 2 we extend the time series back to 1970. We then use ordinary least
squares (OLS) to fit an exponential time trend for each decade. The estimated coefficient on the
year (Y) is then an estimate of the average annual rate of change in energy intensity (EI) and
carbon intensity (CI). These calculations show that energy intensity of GDP declined by an
estimated 1.9% annually in the 1970s. This was a period with rapidly rising energy prices
brought about by the first oil crisis of the early 1970s. Rising prices and concerns about fuel
embargos produced strong incentives for energy efficiency and structural change. At the same
time, Japan’s economy grew at 4% annually. In the 1980s the average annual improvement in
energy intensity fell to about 1.6% while the economy continued to grow by 4% per year. The
second oil shock occurred late in the 1970s and brought about another round of rising energy
prices that likely affected energy use at least into the early 1980s. By the middle of the decade
world oil prices had fallen considerably from their peak. While energy intensity improvement
slowed somewhat in the 1980s, carbon intensity improved more rapidly in the 1980s (2.5%/yr.)
than in the 1970s (2.2%/yr.). The direct reason for this divergence of energy and carbon intensity
was the increased share of nuclear and natural gas in primary energy supply.
9Figure 3. Japan’s real GDP and CO2 Emissions. (Data Source: Institute of Energy Economics, Japan
2004; MOE, 2002.)
Figure 4. Energy Intensity and Carbon Intensity in Japan. (Data Source: Institute of Energy
Economics, Japan, 2004; EI:  Energy Intensity, CI: Carbon Intensity, Y: Year.) 95% confidence
limits on Energy Intensity Improvement Rate: 1970s: –2.7% < x < –1.1%; 1980s: –2.1% < x <
–1.2%; 1990s and after: –0.1% < x < 0.3%.
Too much should not be made of the slight differences between the performance in the 1970s
and 1980s. For one thing, the estimated time trends between decades are not significantly
different from one another at a 95% confidence level. Beyond that, using a decade as the
breakpoint is arbitrary. The overall conclusion is that at least in terms of the aggregate
performance of energy and carbon intensity the 1970s and 1980s were, for Japan, very similar.
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The 1990s offer a strong contrast from the 1970s and 1980s. Both energy and carbon intensity
are nearly flat and not significantly different than zero. The point estimate of the average energy
intensity actually increased very slightly, while the carbon intensity average decrease was less
than 0.5% per year. A number of things changed in Japan in the 1990s. For one, it was a period
of slow GDP growth with a rate of 1.4% per year. Unlike the 1970s and 1980s, international
energy prices were relatively stable and low. The slight improvement in carbon intensity can
again be traced to greater use of nuclear and natural gas, as their share of primary energy supply
rose from 9 to 12% and 10 to 14%, respectively (Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, 2004).
The actual data plotted in Figure 4 suggest the slowdown of both carbon and energy intensity
may have had its roots as early as 1986. Removing the transition years in the late 1980s from the
earlier decade estimates would likely thus show an even greater difference between the rapid
improvements through about 1985 and the negligible improvement since 1990.
What can Japan expect in terms of energy and carbon intensity improvement in a reference
(i.e., no policy) case through the Kyoto commitment period? Will it return to the rapid
improvements of the 1970s and early 1980s, or can it expect performance more like the 1990s?
The answer depends in large part on what is behind the change and there are several possible
explanations. More detailed statistical analysis that attempt to sort out the effect of energy prices
and other factors might help explain the reason for this change, but unfortunately many of the
changes occurred together and this high correlation will make it difficult to separate the effect of
each factor. Here we identify the leading hypotheses that could explain this change in
performance in the Japanese economy and their very different implications for projections of
Japan’s future and the difficulty of meeting the Kyoto target.
If the differences are mainly due to energy prices, then possibly the recently high oil and gas
prices may spur improving energy and carbon efficiency. However, the fuel mix change that led
to more rapid increases in carbon than energy intensity is unlikely to continue. Gas could
penetrate further but unlike the previous periods when oil prices rise led the way and encouraged
a switch to gas, in recent years gas prices have risen rapidly for independent reasons and so there
may be less economic incentive to switch from oil to gas even with rising oil prices. As in most
other industrial countries, nuclear expansion in Japan has slowed dramatically with few new
plants expected to come on line in the near term. Thus, even if rising energy prices spur
improvements in energy intensity, these may not be accompanied by an additional improvement
in carbon intensity as occurred in the 1980s. It is worth examining again the cross country
comparison of carbon intensity in Figure 2 to note that Japan’s slowdown in the 1990s is more
pronounced than most other countries. This suggests that energy prices are not the sole
explanation for it because energy price changes reflect to a large degree changes in international
markets that were felt in all countries.
Another hypothesis is that rapid economic growth stimulates rapid energy efficiency
improvement. The argument here is that with rapid growth comes a rapidly expanding capital
stock, and perhaps rapid replacement of old capital. If the newer equipment and technology is
more energy efficient than the old then improvement in energy efficiency will result. It is also
likely that structural change is hastened by rapid economic growth, and if structural change is
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toward sectors that are less energy and emissions intensive—the service sectors are often offered
as a candidate—then the aggregate energy intensity improvement will be faster when economic
growth is faster. If these processes are at work then the low economic growth projections for
Japan over the next decade would be inconsistent with rapid improvement in energy and carbon
intensity. On the other hand, rising energy prices may also stimulate structural shifts and
replacement of capital stock, and so there is likely some interaction between growth and price
change as a source of intensity change.
Another possibility is that Japan has exhausted many of the immediate sources of
improvement in energy intensity while other industrial countries have not yet done so. The case
to be made here is that Japan has been at the leading edge of intensity change among the
industrial countries. With highly efficient processes already widely adopted in Japan, the next set
of energy efficient processes may not be yet proven or possess as clear an economic advantage as
did the technologies contributing to the rapid decline in intensity in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Another general trend among industrial countries in recent decades was a significant reduction in
production of basic materials that are often very energy intensive, such as smelting of ores and
energy intensive chemical production. In some cases this reduction in developed countries led to
imports of these materials from developing countries. In other cases it reflected increased
recycling of scrap or a structural change toward less demand for these materials. This source of
structural change may have reached a limit in Japan. If this is a major reason for a slowdown in
intensity improvement then it is difficult to project whether little or no improvement is only a
pause until new sources of improvement are identified, or the 1990s experience is a new pattern
that will persist for decades. In fact, one can not rule out the possibility that future development
of the economy in Japan may lead instead to energy intensity increases, with the 1990s being the
turning point in the trend. These patterns could have important implications for Japan, and the
world. What had seemed like a reliable trend of improving energy intensity may be ending, and
as other industrial countries catch up to Japan they may face a similar situation.
We return to these trends in later sections when we consider our modeling results and
compare them to the MOE study results.
4. THE EMISSIONS PREDICTION AND POLICY ANALYSIS (EPPA) MODEL
To analyze the Climate Change Tax policy we apply the MIT Emissions Prediction and
Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Babiker et al., 2001, Paltsev, et al. 2003). EPPA is a recursive-
dynamic multi-regional general equilibrium model of the world economy. The version of EPPA
used here (EPPA4) has been updated in a number of ways from the model described in Babiker
et al. (2001). Most of the updates are presented in Paltsev et al. (2003). EPPA is built on the
GTAP data set, which accommodates a consistent representation of energy markets in physical
units as well as detailed accounts of regional production and bilateral trade flows (Hertel, 1997).
Besides the GTAP data set, EPPA uses additional data for greenhouse gas (CO2, CH4, N2O,
HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) and urban gas emissions. For use in EPPA the GTAP dataset is
aggregated into the 16 regions and 10 sectors shown in Table 5. The base-year of the EPPA
model is 1997. From 2000 onward it is solved recursively at 5-year intervals. Because of the
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Table 5. Countries, Regions, and Sectors in the EPPA Model.
Country or Region Sectors
Annex B Non-Energy
United States USA Agriculture AGRI
Canada CAN Services SERV
Japan JPN Energy-Intensive Products EINT
European Union+a EUR Other Industries Products OTHR
Australia/New Zealand ANZ Transportation TRAN
Former Soviet Unionb FSU Energy
Eastern Europec EET Coal COAL
Crude Oil OIL
Non-Annex B Refined Oil REFOIL
India IND Natural Gas GAS
China CHN Electric: Fossil ELEC
Indonesia IDZ Electric: Hydro HYDR
Higher Income East Asiad ASI Electric: Nuclear NUCL
Mexico MEX Electric: Solar and Wind SOLW
Central and South America LAM Electric: Biomass BIOM
Middle East MES Electric: Natural Gas Combined Cycle NGCC
Africa AFR Electric: NGCC with Sequestration NGCCS
Rest of World ROW Electric: Integrated Gasification with
Combined Cycle and Sequestration
IGCCC
Oil from Shale SYNO
Synthetic Gas SYNG
Household
Own-Supplied Transport OTS
Purchased Transport Supply PTS
a The European Union (EU-15) plus countries of the European Free Trade Area (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland).
b Russia and Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (which are included in Annex B) and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (which are not). The total carbon-equivalent
emissions of these excluded regions were about 20% of those of the FSU in 1995. At COP-7 Kazakhstan, which makes up
5-10% of the FSU total, joined Annex I and indicated its intention to assume an Annex B target.
c Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
d South Korea, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand.
e All countries not included elsewhere: Turkey, and mostly Asian countries.
focus on climate policy, the model further disaggregates the GTAP data for energy supply
technologies and includes a number of energy supply technologies that were not in widespread
use in 1997 but could take market share in the future under changed energy price or climate
policy conditions.
Bottom-up engineering detail is incorporated in EPPA in the representation of these
alternative energy supply technologies. The synthetic coal gas industry produces a perfect
substitute for natural gas. The oil shale industry produces a perfect substitute for refined oil.
These potential new sources do not enter over the time periods analyzed here. All electricity
generation technologies produce perfectly substitutable electricity except for the Solar & Wind
technology, which is modeled as producing an imperfect substitute, reflecting its intermittent
output. Biomass use is included explicitly in electric generation.
The EPPA model production and consumption sectors are represented by nested Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions (or the Cobb-Douglas and Leontief special
cases of the CES). The model is written in GAMS-MPSGE. It has been used in a wide variety of
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policy applications (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1997; Jacoby and Sue Wing, 1999; Reilly et al., 1999;
Bernard et al., 2003; Paltsev et al., 2003; Babiker, Reilly and Metcalf, 2003).
In order to model the Japanese Climate Change Tax policy in the EPPA model, we introduce
the tax of 3400 yen/tC on usage of fossil fuel starting from 2005 and distribute the subsidy of
952 billion yen. Because EPPA units are 1997 U.S. dollars, we convert the numbers using the
1997 exchange rate ($1 = 121 yen), which results in a carbon tax of $28/tC and the total subsidy
of $7.87 billion.
The subsidy is distributed among six sectors of the economy as reported in Table 6. The
sectoral structure of the AIM and the EPPA models is different. Therefore, we have made some
adjustments in the subsidy distribution (Table 7). Based on covered facilities we assign the AIM
industry sector to the EPPA energy-intensive industry sector. We also divide subsidies to the
AIM transport sector into the EPPA commercial and household transportation sectors based on
CO2 emission shares from the sectors in 1997. The subsidy is modeled as a negative tax on non-
energy inputs related to equipment purchases into these sectors that would be the source of more
fuel-efficient technology. Fuel use is therefore reduced to the extent the subsidized cost of
equipment allows substitution away from fuels and toward equipment.
Figure 5 shows where the subsidies were applied within the nesting structures of each sector.
For three industrial sectors (EINT, SERV and TRAN), we adjust the capital input tax because the
subsidy is for the equipment and facilities (top panel). For agriculture, we adjust the labor input
tax because the subsidy in agriculture is for the activities such as planting, weeding and thinning
(bottom panel). There is no explicit capital input into the household, and so for the HOUS and
the HTRN sectors the subsidy is applied to the input of the OTHR sector (bottom panel). The
OTHR sector produces energy efficient equipment such as high efficient air-conditioners or
hybrid cars and these products are to be encouraged through the subsidy. To compare more
Table 6. Targeted Sectors and Subsidy in EPPA.
Targeted Sectors in EPPA
Relevant Sector in AIM
Subsidy
(B$/yr)
HOUS Household 2.911
EINT Industry 0.865
SERV Office 1.574
TRAN 0.393
HTRN
Transportation
0.472
AGRI Forest 1.652
Total 7.868
Table 7. Existing Tax, Proposed Subsidy, and Applied Net Rates.
HOUS EINT SERV TRAN HTRN AGRI
Existing tax rate 4.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.14% 0.00%
Subsidy, as a rate -0.30% -0.70% -0.28% -0.75% -0.30% -5.23%
Applied net rate 3.84% -0.70% -0.28% -0.75% 3.84% -5.23%
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Figure 5. Nesting Structure in EPPA, and Application of the Subsidy. Top panel: Nesting Structure of
EINT, SERV, TRAN and AGRI Production Sectors in EPPA. Bottom panel: Structure of the
Household Sector.
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directly with the AIM-EndUse results with regard to the effectiveness of the subsidy we have
established the tax subsidy rates so that the subsidy level will be approximately the $7.87 billion
dollars estimated in the MOE report regardless of the level of tax revenue estimated to be
collected in the EPPA model. This was done by setting the subsidy rate equal to the subsidy
amount to a sector divided by the total value of the input being subsidized in that sector in the
EPPA BAU. Because the policy changes input-use somewhat, the actual subsidy level will differ
slightly from that estimated in the MOE study. It turns out to be the case that emissions in policy
scenarios based on EPPA are as high or higher than those estimated in the MOE report. The
EPPA policy thus collects revenue from the carbon tax in excess of the subsidy. We return this
excess revenue via a lump sum transfer to the representative consumer.
4.1. Economic Growth
The growth rate of GDP is one of the more important factors in projecting future energy and
emissions as shown in the historical relationship in the previous section and as demonstrated in
many modeling studies (Weyant and Hill, 1999). Table 8 shows the variability in real GDP
growth in Japan in 1990-2002. It varies from 3.6% in 1996 to a negative 1.2% in 2001. GDP
grew at an annual average rate of 4.4% between 1970 and 1980 and at 4.0% between 1980 and
1990. The average for the 1990s was only 1.4%. The AIM model sets the growth rate at 0.9%
between 2000 and 2010 and at 1.9% between 2010 and 2020 on the basis of Japanese
government’s economic forecast. We have adjusted Japan’s GDP growth rate in the EPPA model
to the AIM assumptions. The standard reference case of the EPPA is more optimistic about
Japan’s economic recovery and it uses the annual rate of 1.8% for economic growth between
2000 and 2010, and 2.8% during the following decade.
Table 8. Real GDP growth in Japan (%).
Historic AIM
EPPA Standard
 Reference
1991 2.2
1992 1.1
1993 – 1.0
1994 2.3
1995 2.4
1996 3.6
1997 0.6
1998 – 1.0
1999 0.9
2000 3.0
2001 – 1.2
2002 1.2
1970-1980 4.4
1980-1990 4.0
1990-2000 1.4
2000-2010 0.9 1.8
2010-2020 1.9 2.8
Source: Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (2004).
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4.2. CO2 Emissions
Using the adjusted EPPA model, we simulate the reference case from 1997 to 2020 and
compare the sectoral CO2 emissions from the energy related sources in 2000 and 2010 with those
from the AIM model. The results are presented in Table 9. The CO2 emissions have been
allocated to sectors following the convention of the AIM model, attributing emissions from
electricity generation to end-use sectors on the basis of their electricity use. In Table 9 the
corresponding EPPA sectors are listed below the AIM sectors.
Despite the difference in their structure, the AIM and EPPA models project a similar sectoral
CO2 emissions distribution. In 2000 carbon emissions from the industry, transportation,
households, and services are close in the two models. However, there are some differences in the
emissions from the energy sectors, although this may reflect that fact that we cannot make a
sectoral aggregation from EPPA that is completely comparable to that of AIM.
For 2010, Table 9 presents the sectoral emissions from the EPPA model for two scenarios: the
standard EPPA reference case and the case where we have adjusted the economic growth in Japan
to match the AIM economic projections. As the table shows, the models differ in their projections
for the industry sector. Even with the same assumptions about the economic growth, the AIM
model forecasts a reduction in emissions from the industry sector of 5%, while in the EPPA model
emissions from the industry increase by 3%. Total CO2 emissions in 2010 in the EPPA model are
2.7% higher than in the AIM model. As a result, the required reduction in CO2 emissions to reach
the Kyoto target is 14% in the AIM model and 16% in EPPA relative to the BAU emissions.
Table 9. Sectoral CO2 Emissions in a Reference Case (MtCO2).
EPPA
Ave. GDP growth of 1.8%/yr Ave. GDP growth of 0.9%/yr
AIM
(Ave. GDP growth of 0.9%/yr)
2000 2010
Absolute Change
(%) 2010
Absolute Change
(%) 2000 2010
Absolute
Change (%)
Industry
AGRI,EINT,OTHR
524 588
+64
(+12.2)
540
+16
(+3.1)
495 470
– 25
(– 5.1)
Household
HOUS
151 176
+25
(+16.6)
159
+8
(+5.3)
166 193
+27
(+16.3)
Service
SERV
162 173
+11
(+6.8)
163
+1
(+0.6)
152 162
+10
(+6.6)
Transportation
TRAN,HTRN
301 340
+39
(+13.0)
310
+9
(+3.0)
256 271
+15
(+5.9)
Energy Transformation
COAL,OIL,ROIL,GAS
38 47
+9
(+23.7)
43
+5
(13.2)
86 88
+2
(+2.3)
TOTAL 1176 1324
+148
(+12.6)
1217
+41
(+3.5)
1155 1185
+30
(+2.6)
4.3. Energy Efficiency Improvement
The conventional approach for taking technological change into account as it affects energy
efficiency in long-term energy projections is to use an exogenous factor conventionally referred
to as the Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvement (AEEI). The AEEI reduces the energy
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required in each sector to produce the same amount of output, assuming other things such as
energy prices are unchanged. In an actual forward simulation of the model, other things such as
energy prices change endogenously, and these changes also affect energy efficiency. Actual
energy efficiency of production of each sector in forward simulations is thus a combination of
the exogenous AEEI factor, and endogenous effects through changes in fuel and other prices.
The AEEI can thus be seen as a reduced-form parameterization of the evolution of non-price
induced changes in energy demand. Often it is assumed that AEEI represents technical change,
but it should be seen as broadly representing other changes such as in the structure of production
within the aggregate sectors (Babiker et al., 2001).
The EPPA assumptions for AEEI among the Annex B countries, implies an energy efficiency
improvement in the electric sector of 0.40% to 0.45% per year while non-electric sectors increase
in energy efficiency by 1.2% to 1.3% per year. In Japan, the energy efficiency of the electric
sector is modeled as improving at a rate of 0.40% per year while non-electric sectors increase in
energy efficiency by 1.0% per year. This rate slows gradually in Japan over the period 2000 to
2015 because Japanese energy efficiency is already quite high, and so the options for further
improvement may be more limited than in other regions.
4.4. Energy Sector
Because of the domestic availability of resources and other factors, there is a large difference
among developed countries in terms of the fuels used to produce electricity, and also in the
efficiency of conversion and this affects CO2 emissions among countries. This, in turn, affects the
options available to reduce emissions. Table 10 presents the shares of different technologies for
electricity production in Japan, Europe, USA, and Canada as they are reported by IEA (1997) and
implemented in the EPPA model. In the U.S., for example, more than one-half of the electricity
production is from coal. Fuel-switching from coal to gas could in principle reduce emissions from
the production of that electricity by one-half or more given the fact that CO2 per exajoule of gas
combusted is lower than that of coal. Gas turbine technology is also considerably more efficient
than the existing baseload coal generation capacity in the U.S., and this would confer further
reduction benefits to a switch to gas in the United States. In contrast, Japan has a relatively low
share of the coal-based electricity, limiting the degree to which fuel shifting to gas or oil could
reduce emissions, and its coal capacity is more efficient on average than that in the U.S.
Table 10. Electricity Shares and Total Electricity Production in 1997.
 Japan Europe USA Canada
COAL 0.19 0.28 0.54 0.17
ROIL 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.02
GAS 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.04
NUCLEAR 0.31 0.36 0.18 0.14
HYDRO 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.61
Other 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Total (1012 kWh) 1.027 2.407 3.670 0.573
Source: IEA (1997)
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The potential role of nuclear power in most countries is highly dependent on licensing and
siting issues. To take these political factors into account, nuclear power capacity expansion in
EPPA is controlled via the growth of a fixed factor that represents fuel supply. The fixed factor
growth is an exogenous assumption to reflect limits on expansion because of siting and licensing
issues. Generation of nuclear electricity from the installed capacity can respond to price via the
ability to substitute capital and labor for the fixed factor—given the structure of EPPA this can
be thought of as similar to increasing the capacity utilization factor. In Japan, the nuclear fixed
factor is exogenously set to increase at 0.5% per year, thus limiting capacity expansion to this
rate. This is somewhat slower than the Japanese government forecast for a 2.5% growth in
nuclear capacity but more rapid than in the U.S., for example, where the growth is set to zero.
The existing energy tax system is also important because climate policy can interact with pre-
existing taxes to affect the country’s economic cost of climate policy (Paltsev et al., 2004).
Table 11 presents the tax rates on energy use for private consumption as derived from the GTAP
database and used in the EPPA model. This tax is mostly related to the tax of motor vehicle
fuels. The highest tax rates are in Europe, Japan is next highest, Canada has much lower taxes,
and the USA energy taxes are essentially zero. In construction of these tax rates, the motor fuel
excise tax in the U.S., since it is used to fund highway construction, is treated as a user charge
for the highway service rather than as a tax. The tax ranking is the same for industrial use of
energy. The Climate Change Tax as proposed is an additional tax on fuels beyond the existing
fuel taxes in Japan. It is therefore likely to increase the economic loss from these taxes beyond
the direct cost of the Climate Change Tax as shown in Paltsev et al. (2004).
Table 11. Tax Rates on Energy Products for a Private Use.
 Japan Europe USA Canada
COAL 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.00
ROIL 2.66 4.70 0.00 1.30
GAS 0.28 0.81 0.00 0.09
ELEC 0.04 0.42 0.00 0.09
5. SIMULATION RESULTS
5.1 Comparison Using EPPA Reference Parameters
In order to estimate the effects of the proposed carbon tax in the EPPA model we consider the
following scenarios. The business-as-usual (BAU) scenario uses the usual EPPA values and
parameters with the adjusted economic growth rate as described above. The Carbon Tax (CT)
scenario introduces a carbon tax of $28/tC from 2005 without distributing the subsidy to the
sectors. In this case the revenue from the tax is returned to the representative agent in a lump-
sum fashion. The Carbon Tax and Subsidy (CTS) scenario considers both the carbon tax and the
subsidy to six targeted sectors as described in Section 4. The results of the simulations are
presented in Table 12. It shows that GDP and the welfare losses are less than 1.0%.2 Carbon
emissions are reduced in 2010 by 5.6% in comparison to the BAU scenario, leaving emissions in
                                                 
2
 The welfare loss, computed by EPPA but not by the AIM model, can be thought of as the loss in consumption.
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Table 12. Change in Energy-related CO2 Emissions, GDP, and Welfare (%) relative to BAU.
EPPA AIM
CT CTS CT CTS
% Change in Emissions
2005 – 5.2 – 5.2
2010 – 5.6 – 5.7 – 11.9 – 14.2
2015 – 5.8 – 5.9
2020 – 6.0 – 6.1
% Change in GDP
2005 – 0.17 – 0.12
2010 – 0.18 – 0.14 – 0.16 – 0.06
2015 – 0.19 – 0.15
2020 – 0.19 – 0.15
% Change in Welfare
2005 – 0.07 – 0.07
2010 – 0.09 – 0.10
2015 – 0.10 – 0.11
2020 – 0.11 – 0.12
2010 12% above the Kyoto target. The CTS scenario shows very little additional emissions
reduction compared with the CT case, less than rounding in 2005. A small effects should be
expected given the low rate of subsidy (as reported in Table 7), and the fact that we apply the
subsidy only on non-energy input. As implemented in our scenario, the subsidy is thus a fairly
blunt incentive instrument, not very narrowly targeted to improving energy efficiency. These
results differ in important ways from the AIM results. First, BAU emissions in EPPA are
somewhat higher than in AIM, as shown in Table 9, requiring a bigger reduction to meet the
Kyoto Target. Second, the Climate Change Tax is less effective in EPPA than in AIM at
reducing emissions. Third, the subsidy has much less impact in EPPA than in the AIM results.
Together these differences mean the EPPA results for the CTS case leave Japan far from meeting
the Kyoto Target, whereas AIM found this policy to be sufficient to meet the target.
5.2 Sensitivity Tests of Results
Clearly the parameters determining the baseline energy intensity improvement and response
to the subsidy are important assumptions in the EPPA model results, and these are uncertain.
Moreover, our approach of subsidizing capital or labor could be criticized because it may not
target energy-saving technology as effectively as is possible. We thus turn our attention to
further examine energy intensity given that improving energy efficiency is a central objective of
the Climate Change Tax policy proposed by the MOE. We first test the sensitivity of results to
the AEEI in the BAU case (i.e., without the Climate Change Tax). We then consider alternative
AEEI assumptions in combination with the CTS scenario.
We study sensitivity to AEEI in the general economy, leaving the AEEI in the electric sector
unchanged because the subsidy is to be paid to technologies in the energy use sectors, not to
those in electric generation. We consider the following growth rates of AEEI beginning in 1997:
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1.0 (default value; BAU case), 1.5, 2.0, 2.5 and 0 (zero)% in the BAU scenario. We then
calculate the resulting changes in projected aggregate energy intensity. Recall that the rate of
intensity change will be the combined effect of the AEEI and endogenous factors such as
structural change and response to changing prices, as well as the unchanged rate of improvement
in the electricity generation sector.
At the reference AEEI of 1.0% per year energy intensity declines by approximately 0.5% per
year in the decade between 2000 and 2010, and intensity improvement increases to over one
percent in the following decade (Figure 6). This is a considerably more rapid improvement than
in the 1990s when energy intensity was virtually unchanged, but not nearly as rapid as the rate in
the 1970s and 1980s. An assumption of a zero change in AEEI still results in a 0.3 to 0.4%
annual decrease in Japan’s energy intensity of GDP for the 2000-2010 period, faster than the rate
of the 1990s. An AEEI of 2.0 and 2.5 results in an intensity improvement of 1.8 to 2.0% per
year. This is at the high end or beyond the rate experienced in the 1970s and 1980s.
Figure 6. Energy Intensity Sensitivity to AEEI Assumptions
As shown in Table 13, these different assumptions about AEEI make large differences in the
BAU emission projections. While the assumption of 1.0% growth in AEEI puts Japan in the
BAU scenario 19.1% above the Kyoto requirement, the assumption of 2.5% growth in AEEI
reduces the excess emissions to 2.8%. On the other hand, if intensity improvement remains very
low (with AEEI at zero) Japan could find itself nearly 24% above the Kyoto target absent
specific climate policies. Also note that higher energy efficiency is a form of improved
productivity, meaning that products can be produced with less cost. Higher AEEI thus also
increases economic growth. Note that Table 13 reports the GDP effect in terms of change from
the reference in that year. A 2.0% increase in GDP in 2020 above the reference translates into
less than a 0.1% increase in the annual rate of growth of GDP over a 20 year period.
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Table 13. Change in GDP, CO2 emissions and excess of emissions over the Kyoto target (%) in the BAU
scenario with different rates of AEEI relative to the BAU with 1% of AEEI.
AEEI rates: 1.5% 2% 2.5% 0
% Change in GDP
1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2000 0.11 0.22 0.32 – 0.29
2005 0.24 0.47 0.68 – 0.41
2010 0.39 0.75 1.09 – 0.64
2015 0.56 1.08 1.55 – 1.15
2020 0.76 1.43 2.04 – 1.80
% Change in Emissions
1997 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2000 – 1.5 – 3.1 – 4.5 2.8
2005 – 3.2 – 6.2 – 9.2 3.2
2010 – 4.8 – 9.4 – 13.7 4.0
2015 – 6.5 – 12.5 – 18.0 7.5
2020 – 8.2 – 15.6 – 22.4 11.4
% Emissions above the Kyoto target
2010 13.4 8.0 2.8 23.9
We now turn to the potential further interaction between energy efficiency improvement and
the Climate Change Tax. The difference in AIM and EPPA results can be interpreted in at least
two ways. One interpretation is that the EPPA model may simply underestimate the likely future
energy intensity improvement in the no-policy reference. With a higher or lower rate of energy
intensity improvement in the BAU, the CTS case will come closer or further, respectively, from
the Kyoto target. Another interpretation is that the subsidy plan and voluntary measures
encouraged by the Japanese government may somehow stimulate energy efficiency improvement
far more effectively than estimated endogenously within the EPPA model, perhaps by targeting
the subsidy more effectively than we have through a subsidy of capital, labor, or other equipment
purchase. In this second case the argument would be that these subsidies overcome barriers to
adoption of what turns out to be economically preferable technologies.
To approximate this latter interpretation we assume different growth rates of AEEI starting
after 2005, as if they were a response to introduction of the carbon tax and subsidy. The scenarios
labeled CTS1.5, CTS2, and CTS2.5 in Table 14 reflect a growth in AEEI of 1.5, 2.0, and 2.5%
respectively. We compare the policy results against the BAU scenario with a growth rate of AEEI
of 1.0%. The calculation shows that to meet the Kyoto target with the proposed carbon tax we
need to assume that the subsidy would increase the exogenous energy efficiency growth to 2.5%
per year (CTS2.5). This assumption implies an overall energy intensity improvement above 2.0%
per year, which is more rapid than Japan experienced in the 1970s and 1980s when the economy
was growing rapidly and energy prices created large incentives to reduce fuel use. Compared with
the reference case, GDP also increases in the policy cases with higher AEEI. The exogenous
improvement in the AEEI is a boost to economic activity that more than offsets the negative effect
of the introduction of the carbon tax. Again, it is only possible for a policy of this type to increase
GDP if the subsidy and education efforts serve to overcome barriers to adoption of technologies
that turn out to be economically superior to those that otherwise would have been chosen.
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Table 14. Change in GDP, CO2 emissions and excess of emissions over the Kyoto target (%) in the
CTS scenarios with different rates of additional AEEI relative to the BAU scenario.
Scenarios: CTS CTS1.5 CTS2 CTS2.5
% Change in GDP
1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2005 – 0.12 – 0.12 – 0.12 – 0.12
2010 – 0.14 0.21 0.53 0.83
2015 – 0.15 0.39 0.87 1.32
2020 – 0.15 0.59 1.25 1.84
% Change in Emissions
1997 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2005 – 5.2 – 5.2 – 5.2 – 5.2
2010 – 5.7 – 9.8 – 13.7 – 17.4
2015 – 5.9 – 11.6 – 16.9 – 21.9
2020 – 6.1 – 13.5 – 20.2 – 26.4
% Emissions above the Kyoto target
2010 12.4 7.5 2.8 – 1.5
Given that CTS2.5 achieves the Kyoto target and is thus similar to the AIM results, we
examine sectoral reductions from BAU for that case and compare them to the AIM results
(Table 15). Total carbon emissions are reduced by 17% from BAU in the EPPA model and by
14% in the AIM model. Sectoral emissions show differential reduction of 8-31% in the EPPA
and of 9-29% in the AIM. Both models predict that the highest percent reductions come from the
household and service sectors. In absolute terms, the biggest reduction comes from industry
(83 Mt) in the EPPA model and from the household sector (57 Mt) in the AIM model.
Table 15. Sectoral CO2 emissions in EPPA and AIM (Mt-CO2).
EPPA AIM
BAU CTS2.5 BAU CTS
2000 2010 (a) 2010 (b) (b)–(a) (%) 2000 2010 (c) 2010 (d) (d)–(c) (%)
Industry
AGRI,EINT,OTHR
524 540 457
– 83
(– 15%)
495 470 427
– 43
(– 9%)
Household
HOUSE
151 159 115
– 44
(– 28%)
166 193 136
– 57
(– 29%)
Service
SERV
162 163 112
– 51
(– 31%)
152 162 127
– 35
(– 22%)
Transport
TRAN, HTRN
301 310 286
– 24
(– 8%)
256 271 247
– 24
(– 9%)
Energy Transformation
COAL,OIL,ROIL,GAS
38 43 36
– 7
(– 16%)
86 88 80
– 8
(– 9%)
TOTAL 1176 1217 1006
– 211
(– 17%)
1155 1185 1017
– 168
(– 14%)
Note: Numbers in brackets represent percent of emissions reduction in a policy case relative to BAU in 2010.
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Figure 7 compares sectoral emissions from the EPPA forecasts for 2010 in the BAU, CTS,
and CTS2.5 scenarios using the sectoral aggregation in EPPA that does not allocate electricity
emissions to end-use sectors. In the BAU, the total CO2 emissions are 1217 Mt with the electric
sector being the leading emitter, accounting for one-third of the total emissions. The energy
intensive industry sector and the transportation sector follow with 20% and 13% shares of total
emissions, respectively. An introduction of the carbon tax with subsidy causes the total emission
to fall to 1148 Mt. The CTS2.5 case results in an additional 142 Mt reduction to 1006 Mt.
Figure 7. Sectoral CO2 Emissions from EPPA in the BAU, CTS and CTS2.5 scenarios.
Notably more than half of the additional 142 Mt reduction comes from the electric sector
where we have not adjusted the energy efficiency because the electric sector does not benefit
directly from the proposed subsidy. Reduced emissions from the electric sector are due instead
mainly to the fact that improved efficiency elsewhere in the economy leads to a reduction in the
demand for electricity, and that reduction is disproportionately from fossil fuel generation
(Figure 8). In the reference case, total electric generation gradually increases from 0.913 to
0.949 x 1012 kWh during the period, and the shares by generation type change little. In contrast,
in the CTS2.5 scenario total generation is 13% lower than in the BAU, with fossil fuel generation
falling by 20%.
We have focused on the CTS2.5 case because it meets the Kyoto target. However, serious
questions can be raised about the likelihood of energy intensity improving at such a rapid rate.
As we reviewed in Section 3, energy intensity improvement at the rate implied in this scenario
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Figure 8. Electric Generation in EPPA in the BAU, CTS, and CTS2.5 scenarios.
would be faster than even that of the 1970s and 1980s, a period of rapid economic growth and
major structural change in Japan, and of sharp increases in energy prices. While energy prices
have risen in the last couple of years and the Climate Change Tax would further increase them,
in real terms they remain below the peaks reached in the 1970s and so it is not clear that energy
prices will provide the same incentive to improve energy efficiency as in the 1970s and early
1980s. In addition, the forecast BAU growth rate of GDP in these scenarios, set to match the
government forecast as used in the AIM model (see Table 8), is even slower for 2000 to 2010
than the 1990s, and it only recovers to the 1990s rate after 2010. With this relatively slow rate of
growth, it seems less likely that there will be a major transformation of the capital stock and
restructuring of the economy as occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.
5.3 Likely Performance of Technology Subsidies
The EPPA model can be used to test likelihood that subsidy incentives in the Climate Change
Tax plan can encourage energy efficiency improvements of the magnitude estimated in the AIM
analysis. A large portion of the carbon saving in the EPPA estimate comes from reduced demand
for electricity, and evidence of the effect of technology subsidies can be seen in the experience of
demand-side management by electric utilities in the U.S. These measures became popular among
utilities as a way of avoiding the need to construct new capacity, and self-reporting by the
utilities seemed to suggest they were successful at reducing energy use through subsidizing
purchase of high efficiency equipment and through other demand-side measures. However, a
25
recent study by Loughran and Kulich (2004) seriously questions the effectiveness of these
programs. They note that electric utilities in the U.S. spent $14.7 billion between 1989 and 1999
on these programs, and based on their self-reported electricity savings they calculate the cost of
these programs at $0.029 per kWh of saved electricity. Other estimates in the literature they
review find costs per kWh saved in a similar range. Loughran and Kulich (2004) challenge the
self-reported savings by using econometric techniques to statistically estimate the electricity
savings. They find much lower actual savings, and arrive at an estimated cost per kWh saved as
high as $0.223. Even among the subset of utilities that they found were most effective at
demand-side management the cost per kWh was still $0.064, more than twice the self-reported
cost average for all utilities.
If we assume the demand-side management experience in the U.S. is relevant to Japan’s
subsidy plan, we can use these results to estimate an average cost per ton of carbon reduced. To
do this, we use the average carbon emissions per kWh of reduced generation in the simulation
results when we compare CTS and CTS 2.5. If the program is as successful as self-reported by
the U.S. utilities and costs $0.029 per kWh, the average cost per ton of carbon is $155/tC.3 If cost
is at the high end of the Loughran and Kulich estimate of $0.223 kWh saved then the cost per ton
of carbon is $1193/tC. If the program can do as well as the sub-sample of utilities that Loughran
and Kulich found to be most effective at demand-side management, then the cost is $342/tC.4
These results suggest that, if U.S. historical experience is only approximately relevant to
Japanese conditions, the proposed subsidy program will likely prove economically unattractive.
Even at the most optimistic estimate of $0.029 per kWh the average cost per ton of carbon saved
is far higher than the marginal tax rate, which is only $28 per ton. Thus it is questionable whether
the subsidy will bring forth the large reductions estimated in the MOE (2003) report. If anything,
our EPPA model results for the CTS case may be overly optimistic unless energy intensity
improvement rebounds substantially from the poor performance of the 1990s.
6. INTERNATIONAL EMISSION TRADING
If the domestic Climate Change Tax is likely to be insufficient to reduce Japan’s emissions to
the Kyoto Protocol target, what role could international emissions trading play. The MOE report
published in 2003 (MOE, 2003) recommends limiting the contribution of international emission
trading to 1.6% of the 1990 emissions. The EPPA model can simulate the emission trading of all
six greenhouse gases mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol, but here we consider only CO2 trading
for comparison with the AIM model results. The constraints for the Annex B Kyoto member
countries are set to include the full amount of carbon sinks provided in the Marrakesh agreement
(UNFCCC, 2001). The EPPA model can also simulate a country’s domestic policy both in terms
of carbon price constraint or a quantity constraint. Instead of assigning a certain carbon tax as
before, here we assign the quantity constraints for the Annex B countries and analyze the
                                                 
3
 Our calculations of cost per ton assume a carbon intensity of electric generation of 0.686 kg-CO2/kWh.
4
 Note also that the Loughran and Kulich (2004) results are for an average cost, and the Climate Change Tax is a
marginal cost. We do not have the information from Loughran and Kulich on marginal cost, which one would
expect to be higher than the average.
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changes in welfare, production, consumption, and the resulting carbon prices. We set a growth
rate in AEEI in Japan at the original reference value of 1.0%. We introduce the carbon policy in
2010 and compare the BAU scenario with the scenarios where the Kyoto targets are imposed
with or without international emission trading. Potential emission reduction credits from Clean
Development Mechanism or Joint Implementation projects are not taken into account in these
scenarios.
It has been widely recognized in previous studies that the potential for emissions trading to
reduce cost is greatly affected by sale of “hot air” from the former Soviet Union. “Hot air” refers
to the fact that the emission quotas for Russia and Ukraine appear to be in excess of their
expected emissions for the Kyoto commitment period under BAU conditions. The generous
allocation came about because 1990 was used as the baseline for Kyoto reductions. Due to the
severe economic downturn in these countries immediately after 1990, emissions fell by nearly
one-half and few if any analysts expect emissions to recover to 1990 levels by the Kyoto
commitment period (Victor et al., 1998; Paltsev, 2000). The allocation of the “hot air” essentially
relaxes the constraint on the Annex B parties if they are made available through the flexibility
mechanisms in the agreement. It is not clear if Russia and Ukraine will be able to sell the full
amount of their “hot air” or that it would be desirable for them to do so as they may have an
interest in banking the allowances for future use or restricting sales to exercise market power
(Bernard et al., 2003). There has also been resistance among some Parties, such as the European
Union, to use this hot air because purchasing it does not result in any environmental benefit. One
proposed solution is the Green Investment Scheme (GIS). In this scheme “hot air” would be
exchanged with Annex B parties if they invested in “green” projects in the hot air countries.
Green projects could be environmental management capacity-building or any project deemed
environmentally friendly even if it had no particular direct effect on greenhouse gas emissions.
This requirement would answer the concern of Annex B Parties that the hot air purchase had no
environmental benefit (Moe et al., 2001; World Bank et al., 2004).
The various uncertainties in the availability of international emissions allowances and
possible limits to trade, lead us to consider the following cases.
No Emission Trading – all Kyoto parties meet their constraints by domestic policies;
Full Emission Trading – all Kyoto parties participate in the international emission trading
using the full amount of “hot air” from the former Soviet Union;
No Inclusion of FSU – same as above but the former Soviet Union is not included in the
international emission trading;
BAU Capped – same as above but the former Soviet Union is capped at its BAU level to
exclude “hot air,” and therefore emissions permit sales are possible only to the extent
abatement below the BAU occurs.
Tables 16 and 17 presents the results of these simulations. Under the No Emissions Trading
case Japan reaches the Kyoto target at a domestic carbon price of $166/tC. In the Full Emission
Trading case we estimate that Japan would buy 155 MtCO2 of allowances (or about 75% of the
required reduction) with an international carbon price of $24/tC to meet its Kyoto target. This
amount of purchased allowances is well above the proposed MOE limit (MOE, 2003) of
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Table 16. Carbon Price in 2010 ($/tC).
Japan joins emission trading Japan does not participate in emission trading 
 Japan’s and World Price Japan’s Price World Price
No Trade - 166 -
Full Trade 24 159 17
No Inclusion of FSU 144 164 141
BAU Capped 75 163 68
Table 17. Change in Welfare (%) in Japan in 2010 relative to the BAU scenario.
 Japan joins emission trading Japan does not participate in emission trading
No Trade - – 0.36
Full Trade – 0.06 – 0.38
No Inclusion of FSU – 0.32 – 0.37
BAU Capped – 0.17 – 0.36
20 MtCO2 which corresponds to 1.6% of 1990 emissions. In the case of No Inclusion of FSU,
Japan buys 17 MtCO2 permits at $144/tC. In the BAU Capped case Japan purchases 87 MtCO2 at
$75/tC. Japan’s decision to participate or not in the international emission trading affects the
carbon prices both in Japan and in the world markets. The world price is higher with the
additional demand for allowances from Japan. The use of unrestricted or “full” emission trading
reduces its welfare cost to one-sixth of that without trading, from 0.36% to 0.06%, but Japan can
achieve substantial savings even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the Russian
allowance is not available in international markets.
We also examined the change in the volume of export and imports of other goods under these
climate policies. The largest changes in trade occurred, not surprisingly, in the energy intensive
sector where added carbon costs would have the biggest effect on product cost because of the
sector’s high carbon intensity. Table 18 shows the net trade flow for the sector in different
scenarios. In comparison to the BAU scenario, net exports of the energy intensive sector
decrease from $10.3 billion to $2.4 billion in the No Trade case. In the Full Emission Trading
case energy intensive exports fall only to $9.4 billion. We attribute this reduction in exports to
decrease in competitiveness of Japanese energy-intensive products due to carbon-related increase
in energy prices in Japan. Carbon abatement leads to a shift of energy-intensive production to
non-abating countries. The resulting increase in carbon emissions in non-abating countries is
called “carbon leakage” (Felder and Rutherford, 1993; Burniaux and Martins, 2000; Paltsev,
2001) and it is an unavoidable shortcoming of any agreement, such as the Kyoto Protocol, with
only partial coverage of nations.
Table 18. Japan’s Energy-Intensive Sector Exports in 2010 (billion$).
BAU 10.3
No Trade 2.4
Full Trade 9.4
No Inclusion of FSU 2.9
BAU Capped 7.1
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7. CONCLUSION
Our analysis of the Japanese Climate Change Tax policy shows that Japan can meet the Kyoto
target with the proposed policy only if energy intensity improvement is assumed to be
substantially higher than forecast by the EPPA model. In the 1990s Japan’s energy intensity did
not improve at all, and if the Climate Change Tax policy were to be successful, it would imply
that the energy intensity improvement would need to exceed 2% per year from now through the
Kyoto commitment period. This is even faster than the rate of increase achieved in the 1970s and
1980s. In many regards, however, the conditions for achieving a high rate of intensity
improvement were much more favorable in the 1970s and 1980s than they are likely to be in
Japan through the Kyoto commitment period. The feature of the Climate Change Tax that
generates large carbon savings in the analysis of the Ministry of Environment report is the use of
revenue to subsidize purchase of efficient equipment. Experience in the U.S. over the recent past
with utility demand-side management, which is in many ways similar to the proposed subsidy,
suggests these programs may be much less effective than needed for Japan to meet its Kyoto
commitment.
This result led us to consider different regimes of domestic and international emission trading
as a way to meet the Kyoto commitment. If full international emission trading is available, the
carbon price, welfare loss, and impact on Japan’s energy-intensive exports is greatly reduced
compared to the case in which Japan makes all of its reductions domestically. The welfare loss in
the trading case is far below cost without trade. Even without access to Russian “hot air,” as
represented by the BAU Capped case, Japan would benefit from greater participation in
international trading than allowed by the proposed policy. This considerable costs saving
depends, of course, on the willing participation of other Annex B Parties in these Kyoto
flexibility mechanisms. The key Parties in this regard are Russia and the Ukraine who would be
the major sellers of allowances.
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